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THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM OF WOLF 
PACKS:  APPLYING THE ANTITRUST 
CONSPIRACY FRAMEWORK TO SECTION 13(D) 
ACTIVIST GROUP FORMATION 
William R. Tevlin* 
 
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires all persons and groups that 
acquire 5 percent or more of an issuer’s outstanding stock to disclose their 
holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Whether a group is 
formed under section 13(d) often is unclear.  The legal precedent is 
ambiguous; courts give more weight to certain forms of circumstantial 
evidence than others without explaining why.  With the substantial increase 
of hedge fund activism—in particular, the wolf pack tactic—further clarity 
or uniformity is necessary.  A “wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge 
funds that employs parallel activist strategies toward a target corporation 
while intentionally avoiding group status under section 13(d). 
Rather than develop a new rule, courts should apply the antitrust 
conspiracy framework from section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.  The 
antitrust precedent identifies conscious parallelism and plus factors as 
evidence of price-fixing conspiracies.  It is based on statutory language, 
and courts are familiar with the precedent, largely because the case law is 
similar to section 13(d) law.  This Note provides a survey of the modern 
section 13(d) group formation landscape and addresses certain forms of 
circumstantial evidence that apply to the wolf pack strategy. This Note then 
advocates that courts should apply the antitrust precedent to section 13(d) 
as a two-part solution:  first by utilizing conscious parallelism and second 
by considering novel plus factors.  Finally, this Note suggests plus factors 
that would be useful in identifying when wolf packs form 13(d) groups while 
avoiding overpunishing those wolf packs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the current hedge fund activism era, shareholder disclosure rules in the 
United States are alarmingly vague and, therefore, require a clear legal 
formula.1  Activism is shareholder conduct for the purpose of instituting 
change within a company without taking actual control of the company.2  
Hedge funds—as opposed to traditional shareholders—are playing a larger 
role in activist campaigns.3  Shareholders, including activists, who acquire 
5 percent or more of an issuer’s stock must file a Schedule 13D with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under section 13(d) of the 
Williams Act.4  Further, a “group” of investors who collectively own 5 
percent or more of a company’s stock is required jointly to file a Schedule 
13D.5 
A “group” is formed when investors act together, or “[agree] to act 
together[,] for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting[,] or disposing of” 
an issuer’s securities.6  In each case, whether a group is formed is a 
question of fact.7  There is no checklist of factors that courts use to 
determine the existence of a 13(d) group.8  This has led courts to place 
differing weights on evidentiary categories of group activity without 
explaining why.9 
Activist hedge funds seek to avoid the 13(d) disclosure requirement.10  
This has contributed to the rise of the wolf pack investment strategy.  A 
“wolf pack” is a loose association of hedge funds that employs parallel 
activist strategies toward a target corporation while intentionally avoiding 
group status under section 13(d).11  Wolf packs have proved wildly 
 
 1. See, e.g., Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Remarks at the Transatlantic 
Governance Dialogue (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/ 
spch121511mls.htm (“We think it’s important to modernize our rules, and we are 
considering whether they should be changed in light of modern investment strategies . . . .”) 
[https://perma.cc/KZC7-A3V7]. 
 2. See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism As a Corrective 
Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1017. 
 3. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at Tulane University Law School 27th 
Annual Corporate Law Institute:  A Few Observations on Shareholders in 2015 (Mar. 19, 
2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/observations-on-shareholders-2015.html#_ftnref5 
[https://perma.cc/Y2GT-NLZB]. 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012). 
 5. See id. § 78m(d)(3). 
 6. See Morales v. Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 7. See id. at 124. 
 8. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 9. See infra Part II.A (discussing the varied importance that courts place on evidence 
categories). 
 10. See infra notes 60–74 and accompanying text (noting the reasons hedge funds avoid 
filing Schedule 13Ds). 
 11. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door:  The Impact of Hedge 
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance 28 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
521, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2656325 [https://perma.cc/VC53-L2J2]. 
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successful, both in implementing change in their targets and garnering 
profits for their members.12  One example of a successful campaign is a 
wolf pack led by Jana Partners that forced PetSmart into a leveraged buyout 
in 2014.13  There, the hedge funds cumulatively owned less than 20 percent 
of PetSmart, but received a windfall of an almost 40 percent return on their 
investment.14 
Scholars are divided on the benefits and disadvantages that hedge fund 
activism provides to both corporations and the economy.15  This debate 
focuses on whether activism provides long-term value to targeted 
companies.16  Regardless, both sides agree that not all activism is 
positive.17  Even renowned activist Carl Icahn said, “We definitely do not 
believe that all activism today is [] good . . . .  There are bad activists, and 
we agree that it’s bad.  All they want to do is get in and rock the boat and 
make a quick trade.”18  This uncertainty and potential for abuse makes it 
essential that courts have a clear checklist of factors to use when 
determining 13(d) group formation. 
While securities laws have not yet developed in this area, established 
antitrust law principles can serve as a model for this analysis.  Section 1 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act seeks to prevent price-fixing conspiracies among 
competitors.19  Antitrust litigation often centers on whether defendants 
entered into an agreement.20  To prove a conspiracy, plaintiffs must show 
the existence of both conscious parallelism and plus factors—evidence that 
“tends to exclude” the probability that defendants acted independently.21  
The antitrust precedent would also be useful in the section 13(d) group 
context because courts are applying a statute that requires them to find an 
agreement.22  Given the similarities that exist between these laws,23 courts 
would benefit from applying the antitrust doctrine to 13(d) group formation.  
Therefore, this Note proposes a two-part solution:  courts should apply the 
conscious parallelism standard as the first element and then consider novel 
 
 12. See infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (discussing the success of the wolf 
pack strategy). 
 13. See Karlee Weinmann, BC Partners Offers $8.7B for PetSmart in 2014’s Biggest 
LBO, LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2014, 7:12 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/604572/bc-
partners-offers-8-7b-for-petsmart-in-2014-s-biggest-lbo [https://perma.cc/F24K-2ECP]. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See White, supra note 3. 
 16. See infra notes 100–03 and accompanying text (noting the competing arguments 
between legal scholars and practitioners). 
 17. See David Benoit & Vipal Monga, Are Activist Investors Helping or Undermining 
American Companies?, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 1:55 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712 [https:// 
perma.cc/MTM9-ALLE]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 20. See William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 393, 399 (2011). 
 21. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAWS 69 (2010) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST LAW]. 
 22. Antitrust cases regarding price-fixing conspiracies often focus on whether an 
agreement was formed. Kovacic et al., supra note 20, at 399. 
 23. See infra Part II.A (discussing the similarities between these doctrines). 
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plus factors that are circumstantial evidence of wolf pack group formation.  
The conscious parallelism and plus factor standard of circumstantial 
evidence from antitrust law provides the more certain solution that section 
13(d) needs. 
Part I of this Note discusses section 13(d) of the Williams Act, activist 
investing, and the legal determinants of what constitutes a 13(d) group.  
Part II analyzes the weight assigned to categories of circumstantial evidence 
of group activity by courts, as well as the antitrust framework used to prove 
a price-fixing conspiracy.  Finally, Part III suggests that the conscious 
parallelism standard should be adopted in wolf pack group formation cases 
and explores the plus factors that could be utilized in section 13(d) litigation 
without overpunishing wolf packs. 
I.  THE INTERPLAY OF SECTION 13(D) 
GROUP FORMATION AND HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM 
This part explains section 13(d) and its significance to hedge fund 
activism.  Part I.A discusses the Williams Act and the purpose of section 
13(d) in securities law, specifically when shareholders act as a group.  Part 
I.B surveys activist investing, while focusing on the significance of wolf 
packs.  Part I.C illustrates the vagueness of laws concerning 13(d) group 
formation.  Finally, Part I.D describes the consequences of forming a group 
and the importance of developing a more certain evaluative framework. 
A.  The Williams Act 
Added as an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in 1968, 
the Williams Act governs acquisitions and tender offers.24  Section 13(d) 
requires persons who acquire beneficial ownership of 5 percent or more of 
any public company to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC within ten days.25  
A Schedule 13D must state the filer’s identity, funding source, investment 
purpose, number of shares, and information about contracts, arrangements, 
or understandings with another person pertaining to the target company.26 
When two or more persons act as a group, they are treated as a single 
person under section 13(d).27  The SEC defined “group” when it codified 
the Williams Act.28  Rule 13d-5(b)(1) states that a group is formed “[w]hen 
two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, 
holding, voting or disposing of” a target’s stock.29  Section 16(b) uses the 
same definition of “group” as 13(d).30  Therefore, this Note will also 
 
 24. See Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 101–02 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2015). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. § 78m(d)(3). 
 28. See Portsmouth Square Inc. v. S’holders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 873 (9th 
Cir. 1985); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2016). 
 29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 30. See id. § 240.16a-1(a)(1); see also Howard O. Godnick & William H. Gussman, Jr., 
Beware the Counterattack Against Activist Investors:  The Group Trap, ACTIVIST INVESTING 
DEV., Fall 2006, at 1. 
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examine section 16(b) group cases to determine what constitutes a group 
under section 13(d).31 
The purpose of section 13(d) is to provide a tool by which a corporation’s 
shareholders and incumbent management receive notice when a large 
amount of shares are purchased.32  The statute was intended to ensure that 
investors remained informed, while giving incumbent management an 
opportunity to expound its position.33  However, Congress recognized that 
shareholder activism can be useful to poorly run businesses and therefore 
did not intend the law to favor incumbent management or activist 
investors.34 
B.  Activist Investing and the Rise of Wolf Packs 
Long gone are the 1980s, which were full of corporate raiders.35  Today, 
raiders are rebranding themselves as activist investors.36  The traditional 
rationale for shareholder activism is to correct agency problems that arise in 
public corporations.37  Activist shareholders can redirect corporate 
governance when boards of directors or management become ineffective, 
opportunistic, or lazy.38 
Shareholders who are dissatisfied with the direction of their corporation 
have two choices:  exit the company by selling their equity or become an 
active voice in the corporation to effectuate change.39  Those shareholders 
who choose to become active participants generally are motivated by the 
opportunity to improve the value of their investments.40 
Traditional activists concentrate on expanding shareholder rights.41  
Generally, these activists hold relatively few shares and employ subtle 
 
 31. Section 16(b) applies to directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than 10 
percent of a security and requires them to disgorge any short-swing profits earned from the 
sale or purchase of that security. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)–(b). 
 32. See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 33. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); H.R. REP. NO. 90-
1711, at 4 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2813; S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 3–4 
(1967). 
 34. See Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 48–59; H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711, at 4, as reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2813; S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 3–4. 
 35. See David Futrelle, Corporate Raiders Beware:  A Short History of the “Poison 
Pill” Takeover Defense, TIME (Nov. 7, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/07/corporate 
-raiders-beware-a-short-history-of-the-poison-pill-takeover-defense/ [https://perma.cc/854R-
N83C]. 
 36. See 60 Minutes:  The Icahn Lift:  60 Minutes’ Lesley Stahl Profiles the Billionaire 
Investor (CBS television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/the-
icahn-lift-2/ [https://perma.cc/R86L-J92H]. 
 37. See MARION F. HARTMANN, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM:  BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS 7 
(2014) (ebook). 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 5. 
 40. See id. at 6–7. 
 41. See Marco Becht et al., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism:  An International 
Study 8 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 402, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271 (noting that this is accomplished by dismantling 
shareholder rights plans, implementing cumulative voting, and changing corporate 
responsibility policies) [https://perma.cc/DV7J-MQCH]. 
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methods to induce change, including writing letters to corporations’ board 
and management, participating in shareholders’ meetings, and talking to the 
press.42  Holding a small number of shares relegates traditional activists to 
being voices that advocate for change, rather than being vehicles that effect 
change.43 
In recent years, hedge funds have become the most distinguished activist 
investors.44  These institutional investors can provide tremendous value to a 
target corporation by effecting change.45  In contrast to traditional activist 
shareholders, hedge funds have vast amounts of capital.46  Hedge fund 
activists aim to control a target corporation’s business strategy and 
management directly.47  Additionally, hedge funds take more involved steps 
to influence corporate strategy than traditional activists.48  Activist hedge 
funds predominantly employ one of three strategies:  push the target to be 
acquired by another corporation at a premium rate, push the target to spin 
off its assets, or push the target to pay dividends to their shareholders.49  
News of a hedge fund activism campaign causes the target’s stock price to 
rise,50 as investors expect that activists will improve the performance of 
target corporations.51 
Activist hedge funds have been particularly effective in their 
implementation of the wolf pack tactic.  Generally, a wolf pack includes a 
lead hedge fund that acquires a larger stake in the target and smaller hedge 
funds that provide support to the lead wolf.52  The lead activist buys equity 
in a target corporation and then tips off other hedge funds regarding its 
plans.53  Generally, these tips are done behind closed doors,54 but 
 
 42. See id. at 9. 
 43. See HARTMANN, supra note 37, at 5. 
 44. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2007). 
 45. See GEORGE P. SCHWARTZ, SHAREHOLDER REBELLION:  HOW INVESTORS ARE 
CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA’S COMPANIES ARE RUN 57 (1995). 
 46. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 9. 
 47. See id. at 8–9 (noting that hedge funds aim to induce spin-offs, the sale of 
subsidiaries, the overhaul of balance sheets, payouts to shareholders, and changes to 
corporate governance); Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1029 (stating that activist hedge 
funds demand changes to business strategy, run proxy contests over current or additional 
board seats, and bring lawsuits against past and present management). 
 48. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 9 (noting that these steps include requesting 
meetings with corporate management and threatening changes to boards of directors or 
litigation). 
 49. See HARTMANN, supra note 37, at 15. 
 50. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1122 (2015). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Alon Brav et al., Wolf Pack Activism 3–4 (Robert H. Smith Sch., Working Paper 
No. RHS 2529230, 2015) [hereinafter Wolf Pack Activism], http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2529230 [https://perma.cc/ZNG8-EKFN].  The lead wolf usually will be the one to speak 
on behalf of all of the wolves. Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund 
Activism:  Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459, 491 (2013). 
 53. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 34.  Tipping leads other activist funds to 
invest in the target, which strengthens the wolf pack’s leverage. See id.  These tips are not 
considered insider trading because the hedge funds owe no fiduciary duty to the target. See 
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sometimes hedge funds tip the media55 or announce their investments 
during presentations at activist conferences.56  If a hedge fund acquires 
more than 5 percent of a target’s stock, the wolf pack is formed during the 
ten-day window preceding the Schedule 13D’s filing.57  This strategy is 
appealing to hedge funds because each can purchase a small share in a 
target—oftentimes less than 5 percent—but their combined stake will be 
significant.58  In order to maximize profits, these activist campaigns are 
relatively short; once a wolf pack achieves its objective, its members sell 
their shares and move on to their next targets.59 
There are several reasons hedge funds avoid becoming a group.60  First, a 
lawsuit alleging 13(d) group status can be very costly for a group’s 
members to defend.61  Every hedge fund seeks to avoid cutting into profits. 
Second, avoiding filing a Schedule 13D can increase profits.  A hedge 
fund may purchase up to 5 percent of the target corporation’s stock largely 
undetected and, therefore, at a lower cost.62  Upon crossing the 5 percent 
equity threshold, the ten-day window allowed by section 13(d) begins.63  
While the target’s stock price may have risen since crossing the 5 percent 
threshold, it generally will be cheaper during this time than after the 
Schedule 13D is filed and the market is alerted to the acquisition.64  Thus, 
there is a large incentive to delay the ten-day window while the stock’s 
value is low. 
Finally, upon filing a Schedule 13D, the target corporation’s board of 
directors is made aware of the investor’s identity.  Directors have a right, 
and are often encouraged, to employ defensive measures when they fear a 
 
id. at 35 n.72 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 
646 (1983)). 
 54. See Susan Pulliam et al., Activist Investors Often Leak Their Plans to a Favored 
Few, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052702304888404579381250791474792 [https://perma.cc/S8UY-KSPT]. 
 55. See Richa Naidu, Starboard Takes Stake in Advance Auto, Urges Changes, REUTERS 
(Sept. 30, 2015, 10:38 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-starboard-value-advance-
auto-idUSKCN0RU0AV20150930#dtGoVOwosASpppEa.97 [https://perma.cc/8APQ-
WG4E]. 
 56. See William Alden, Ackman Outlines Bet Against Herbalife, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K 
(Dec. 20, 2012, 2:08 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/ackman-outlines-bet-
against-herbalife/ [https://perma.cc/YPC4-CKYC]. 
 57. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 33–34.  The ten-day window refers to the 
ten days between when a shareholder crosses the 5 percent threshold and when the 
shareholder must file a Schedule 13D under section 13(d). Id. at 32. 
 58. One study found that a wolf pack’s combined median stake is 17.21 percent of a 
target’s stock. Katelouzou, supra note 52, at 491. 
 59. See Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence:  
Creators or Destroyers of Long-Term Value?, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 813, 825. 
 60. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 28. 
 61. See id. at 29.  A lawsuit like this occurs when a target corporation alleges that hedge 
funds formed a group that acquired over 5 percent of the target’s stock. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012). 
 64. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 29. 
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hostile takeover.65  Corporations tend to adopt a shareholder rights plan 
(more commonly known as a “poison pill”) when facing this threat.66  
Generally, poison pills provide that a “right” is distributed with each share 
of an issuer’s common stock and that right remains with that stock until the 
poison pill is triggered.67  The pill is triggered when an investor acquires an 
identified percentage of the issuer’s common stock, determined by the 
board.68  Once triggered, the rights holders are allowed to purchase 
additional voting securities from the issuer at a steep discount.69  Poison 
pills make a corporation an unattractive target by significantly diluting the 
value of the acquirer’s voting power and the value of his shares if the pill is 
triggered.70 
Wolf packs are a particularly useful method to avoid triggering poison 
pills.  The average hedge fund that files a Schedule 13D reports owning 
slightly less than 10 percent of the issuer’s stock.71  In a wolf pack, other 
smaller hedge funds concurrently buy up the target corporation’s stock.72  A 
standard poison pill is triggered when a person acquires 10 to 20 percent of 
a company.73  So if the smaller wolf pack members acquire, in total, an 
additional 12 to 15 percent during the ten-day window, the poison pill 
would be trigged when the Schedule 13D is filed if those hedge funds 
formed a group.74  Because each smaller member acquires less than 5 
percent of the target, the wolf pack avoids triggering poison pills. 
The rate of independent hedge fund activism and the use of the wolf pack 
tactic have increased.75  Activist campaigns have a high probability of 
 
 65. See Rose & Sharfman, supra note 2, at 1024; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 50, 
at 1154.  While hedge funds do not take a controlling share, the wolf pack is analogous to a 
hostile takeover. See Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, Hedge Fund Activism Vs. Hostile 
Takeover Bids 22 (Swedish House of Finance, Working Paper No. 15-04, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2585836 (suggesting that wolf packs are a substitute for hostile 
tender offers) [https://perma.cc/5Z73-SQ7V]. 
 66. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 30–31. 
 67. CHARLES E. SIMON & CO., CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES:  THE POISON PILL 
DEVICE 1 (1997 ed., Clark Boardman Callaghan ed., 1997). 
 68. See id. at xv. 
 69. See id. at 1. 
 70. See id. at xv. 
 71. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors:  
Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 12 (2013) (finding that the average initial holding is 
8.8 percent); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism:  A Review, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS 
FINANCE 185, 203 (2010) (noting that the average initial holding is 5.3 to 8.8 percent); 
Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Hedge Funds As Shareholder Activists from 
1994–2005, at 29 (July 31, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://www. 
fredgehm.com/images/boyson_mooradian_activism_FINAL.pdf (finding that the average 
initial holding was 8.83 percent) [https://perma.cc/WC3W-7PXG]. 
 72. See Wolf Pack Activism, supra note 52, at 5. 
 73. See Alexandros Seretakis, Hedge Fund Activism Coming to Europe:  Lessons from 
the American Experience, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 438, 465 n.165 (2014). 
 74. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 31. 
 75. See id. at 2.  This is in part due to high profit margins and reductions in the costs of 
activism. See id. at 4.  Costs have decreased due to the dwindling use of staggered boards, 
changes in the powers of proxy advisors, and new SEC regulations. See id. at 18–26.  Courts 
have contributed to the increase of shareholder activism by reducing the punishments 
available when section 13(d) is violated. See Daniel Reynolds, Recent Business Law Case:  
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success.76  On average, these activist funds receive abnormally high returns 
of 7 to 8 percent in the twenty days before and after filing a Schedule 
13D.77  In the first six months of 2014, activist hedge funds outperformed 
hedge funds as a group by over 3 percent.78 
Wolf packs produce appreciably greater returns than endeavors waged by 
single activist funds.79  Wolf packs have at least some success in 78 percent 
of their campaigns, compared to only 46 percent success by hedge funds 
acting independently.80  This amounts to wolf packs receiving, on average, 
14 percent returns, while hedge funds acting independently receive only 6 
percent returns.81 
This success has led to a sharp increase in activist campaigns in the last 
fifteen years.82  In 2014, activists initiated approximately 250 to 344 
different public campaigns.83  In reality, many more corporations likely are 
targeted each year, given that activists consistently report that public 
campaigns represent less than a third of their total engagements.84 
Moreover, activist hedge funds have begun targeting larger corporations.  
In 2013, approximately one-third of all campaigns targeted corporations 
 
CSX Corporation v. The Children’s Investment Fund, DRCHIFFRES (Oct. 19, 2014), 
http://drchiffres.com/2014/10/19/recent-business-law-case-csx-corporation-v-the-childrens-
investment-fund/ [https://perma.cc/23LK-G8YK]. 
 76. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 3 (finding that the probability of achieving success 
is 53 percent globally and 61 percent in North America); see also ACTIVIST INVESTING:  AN 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 9 (Josh Black ed., 2015) 
[hereinafter ACTIVIST INVESTING], http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/ 
20150130_ActivistInsight-SRZ.pdf (observing that 75 percent of activist campaigns were at 
least “partially successful” in 2014, compared to 67 percent in 2013) [https://perma.cc/R374-
52PX]; Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 16 (noting that activist hedge funds won 
nineteen of the twenty-four proxy contests they launched in 2013). 
 77. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 2 (finding 7 percent abnormal returns); see also 
Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 
J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (observing 7 to 8 percent abnormal returns). 
 78. See Rob Copeland, Returns from Activist Hedge Funds Are Causing a Stir, WALL 
STREET J. (July 7, 2014, 6:45 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/returns-from-activist-hedge-
funds-are-causing-a-stir-1404773120 (noting that activist funds had a 6.5 percent rate of 
return while hedge funds as a group had a 3.1 percent rate of return during that time) 
[https://perma.cc/VU6J-WGJD]. 
 79. See Becht et al., supra note 41, at 5, 32, 59. 
 80. See id. at 32. 
 81. See id. at 5. 
 82. See Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, Activist-Strategic Buyer Tag-Teams:  
A New Hostile Takeover Template?, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO:  
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2015, at 14 (9th ed. 2015), http://www.wlrk.com/ 
webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.23878.15.pdf (noting that twenty-seven public 
activist campaigns occurred in 2000 compared to approximately 250 in 2014) 
[https://perma.cc/QL43-CXCV]. 
 83. See id.; ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 8 (noting that 344 public activist 
campaigns occurred in 2014, compared to 291 in 2013).  For the purpose of this Note, a 
public campaign occurs when a hedge fund files a Schedule 13D or publicly announces its 
investment. 
 84. See ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 8. 
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with a market capitalization of over $2 billion.85  Further, activist 
campaigns are targeting more corporations with a market cap of over $10 
billion than ever before.86  This is due in part to activist hedge funds’ 
increase in assets under management87 (AUM).  Today, these funds manage 
approximately $166 billion in assets, compared to only $23 billion in 
2002.88  Some of these individual funds report AUMs over $10 billion.89 
In 2014, wolf pack efforts were particularly successful.  Apart from 
PetSmart,90 another noteworthy campaign was a wolf pack led by Starboard 
Value, which succeeded in replacing Darden Restaurant’s entire board of 
directors.91  Starboard was busy in 2014, beginning eighteen new 
campaigns that year.92  This includes Starboard’s effort to merge Staples 
and Office Depot,93 which resulted in Staples’s $6.3 billion offer to acquire 
Office Depot.94 
Not all activist campaigns, however, have been viewed so kindly.  
Pershing Square Capital took a substantial stake in pharmaceutical company 
Allergan in an effort to pressure Allergan into a hostile takeover by Valeant 
Pharmaceutical—a company notorious for cutting the research and 
development departments of its acquisitions.95  This campaign led to 
 
 85. See Richard Lee & Jason D. Schloetzer, Director Notes:  The Activism of Carl Icahn 
and Bill Ackman 3 (The Conference Board, Working Paper No. DN-V6N10, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442317 [https://perma.cc/3KB8-KJNF]. 
 86. See id. (noting that in 2013, activists targeted forty-two companies with a market 
capitalization of $10 billion, compared to only seventeen companies in 2010). 
 87. See id. at 2. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 8. 
 90. See supra notes 13–14. 
 91. See Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Hedge Fund Starboard Succeeds in Replacing 
Darden Board, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:42 AM), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/activist-hedge-fund-starboard-succeeds-in-replacing-
darden-board/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/E6GQ-H3BH].  This endeavor left the world with the 
gift of the infamous, nearly 300-page long PowerPoint criticizing, among other policies, 
Olive Garden’s unlimited breadsticks. See David Benoit, Starboard’s Olive Garden Slides:  
Salting the Water, Custom Straws and More, WALL STREET J.:  MONEYBEAT (Sept. 12, 2014, 
12:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/09/12/starboards-olive-garden-slides-
salting-the-water-custom-straws-and-more/ [https://perma.cc/TQ4P-G9WK]. 
 92. See ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 76, at 14. 
 93. See John Jannarone, Starboard Letter Urges Staples to Merge with Office Depot, 
CNBC (Jan. 20, 2015, 1:33 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/20/starboard-letter-urges-
staples-to-merge-with-office-depot.html (purchasing a 6.1 percent stake in Staples and a 9.9 
percent stake in Office Depot) [https://perma.cc/9HP5-43PJ]. 
 94. See Taryn Luna, Staples’ Merger with Office Depot Faces Antitrust Questions, BOS. 
GLOBE (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/09/09/staples-
proposed-merger-with-office-depot-faces-antitrust-questions/fvzf4Ri783iiaR757tTPsL/ 
story.html [https://perma.cc/K6FH-BFRJ]. 
 95. See Steve Denning, Case Study:  Activist Hedge Funds in Practice—Bill Ackman, 
FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015, 4:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/ 
2015/02/15/case-study-activist-hedge-funds-in-practice-bill-ackman/ [https://perma.cc/ 
JU7B-HX4D]; Richard Rubin, Ackman ‘Wolf Pack’ Sent Allergan to Foreigners, Ex-CEO 
Says, BLOOMBERG:  BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (July 30, 2015, 11:14 AM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-30/ackman-s-wolf-pack-sent-allergan-to-
foreign-hands-ex-ceo-says [https://perma.cc/4TFQ-4PVU].  Pershing Square’s stake was 9.7 
percent of Allergan. Id. 
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Allergan’s acquisition by white knight96 Actavis, a foreign pharmaceutical 
company, for $66 billion.97  Although the acquisition was friendly, many 
were angry that Pershing Square drove Allergan to a foreign corporation, 
and investors felt slighted because they sold their shares to the hedge fund 
without knowing about the upcoming takeover.98 
In addition to upset investors, hedge fund activism is not without its 
critics.  Legal experts, most notably Martin Lipton, contend that hedge fund 
activism weakens the long-term value of targeted corporations.99  These 
critics claim that hedge funds are interested in short-term gains and, thus, 
make short-term changes without thought for their long-term effects—such 
as cutting a target’s research and development budget before selling their 
stock.100  However, research has yet to validate these claims.101  
Conversely, proponents of activism point to studies demonstrating that 
hedge fund interventions raise the long-term value of target corporations.102 
Those legal scholars who argue over the long-term value of activism are 
the same ones that debate the usefulness of activists themselves.  Supporters 
of activism claim that activists are a check on executives while critics 
contend that activism scares management away from making smart long-
term corporate decisions.103  Regardless of these arguments, the increase in 
activism has led to greater dialogue between companies and their 
shareholders, a generally beneficial consequence.104 
C.  Group Formation Under Section 13(d) 
Investors commonly interact with one another.  Determining that a group 
exists is difficult because of the normalcy of discussion among similarly 
situated market actors who have no intention of working together.  In the 
preeminent group formation case, Morales v. Quintel Entertainment, 
Inc.,105 the Second Circuit held that investors are a group for purposes of 
section 13(d) when they act together, or “agree[] to act together[,] for the 
purpose of acquiring, holding, voting[,] or disposing of” an issuer’s 
 
 96. A “white knight” refers to the acquiring company in a friendly takeover as a 
response to saving a corporation in danger of a hostile takeover. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, 
Lockup Option Defense to Hostile Corporate Takeover, 66 A.L.R. 4th 180, 2[a] (1988). 
 97. See Denning, supra note 95; Rubin, supra note 95. 
 98. See Denning, supra note 95; Rubin, supra note 95. 
 99. Martin Lipton, The Threat to Shareholders and the Economy from Activist Hedge 
Funds, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 14, 2015), http:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/01/14/the-threat-to-shareholders-and-the-economy-from-
activist-hedge-funds/ [https://perma.cc/4TNA-CZL8]; see also Sharfman, supra note 59, at 
103. 
 100. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 47. 
 101. For an extensive discussion of hedge fund activism and long-term value, compare 
Bebchuk et al., supra note 50, at 1100 (providing empirical evidence of long-term value 
creation), with Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 84 (discrediting Bebchuk’s study, and 
arguing that long-term value is destroyed). 
 102. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 50, at 1105–06, 1155. 
 103. See Benoit & Monga, supra note 17. 
 104. See White, supra note 3. 
 105. 249 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2001). 
2016] THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM OF WOLF PACKS 2347 
securities.106  Further, group members are not required to commit to an 
agreement on specified terms; it is merely enough to share a common 
objective regarding one of the above actions.107  Essentially, the agreement 
must be to take concerted action for one of those purposes.108 
Plaintiff-corporations must present direct or circumstantial evidence that 
an agreement exists between group members.109  This agreement may be 
“formal or informal, written or unwritten.”110  Courts generally are looking 
for a “meeting of the minds” between group members.111  Determining 
when a group exists is difficult for several reasons.  First, whether a group 
was formed is a question of fact in each case.112  Second, courts do not have 
a checklist of factors to determine the existence of a 13(d) group.113  
Finally, activist investors are not required to have identical goals on every 
issue or even “march in lockstep” to be labeled a group.114 
D.  Consequences of Forming a Section 13(d) Group 
The greatest threats to investors who form a group are litigation and 
poison pills.  However, activist hedge funds do not seem to fear going to 
court115 because in the past, the SEC rarely scrutinized activist investors.116  
Its approach generally has been hands-off.117  Nevertheless, the SEC 
recently has revamped its efforts to investigate and enforce disclosure 
regulations.118  In March 2015, the agency charged eight directors and 
corporate fiduciaries with section 13(d) violations.119  More recently, the 
SEC has begun investigating a number of activist hedge funds that it 
believes formed 13(d) groups without filing a Schedule 13D.120 
When hedge funds are sued for violating section 13(d), courts are 
reluctant to hold that activists investing in the same target are an 
 
 106. Id. at 123–24; see also Morales v. Freund, 163 F.3d 763, 766 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 107. See Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d at 124. 
 108. See SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kahan & 
Rock, supra note 44, at 1079. 
 109. See Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d at 1163. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.; see also Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d at 124. 
 112. See Quintel Entm’t, Inc., 249 F.3d at 124. 
 113. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 114. Schaffer ex rel. Lasersight Inc. v. CC Invs., LDC, No. 99 Civ. 2821 (VM), 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 24511, at *14, *33 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2002) (quoting Morales v. New Valley 
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 470, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). 
 115. See Lawrence Delevinge, Activist Hedge Funds Shrug Off SEC Collusion Inquiry, 
CNBC (June 5, 2015, 3:25 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/05/activist-hedge-funds-
shrug-off-sec-collusion-inquiry.html [https://perma.cc/K8MR-F228]. 
 116. See Liz Hoffman et al., SEC Probes Activist Funds Over Whether They Secretly 
Acted in Concert, WALL STREET J. (June 4, 2015, 4:53 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
sec-probes-activist-funds-over-whether-they-secretly-acted-in-concert-1433451205 [https:// 
perma.cc/D3VT-FGHF]. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. 
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undisclosed group.121  Even if a court is willing to find that activist 
investors formed a group, punishments for violating section 13(d) have 
become relatively lenient:  courts may enjoin defendants’ right to vote on 
the shares they acquired or may order the group members to correct their 
Schedule 13D disclosures.122  To receive an injunction, an issuer must 
prove that it suffered irreparable harm123 and that “some cognizable danger 
of recurrent violation[s]” exists.124  Further, in the case of a proxy contest, 
an injunction is inapposite under section 13(d) when the necessary 
disclosures were made “in sufficient time for shareholders to cast informed 
votes.”125  This rule makes it difficult for an issuer to obtain an injunction 
against group members from casting their votes.126  Moreover, courts are 
likely only to order that defendants file an accurate Schedule 13D.127  The 
lack of harsh punitive measures explains why activists do not fear litigation. 
Regardless of judicial punishment, hedge funds seek to avoid 13(d) group 
status because boards of target corporations utilize various defensive 
maneuvers.128  In a wolf pack, no member holds enough stock to trigger a 
poison pill individually.129  However, if classified as a group, pack 
members may hold enough to trigger a standard pill.130 
In Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,131 the Delaware Chancery Court 
recently upheld a two-tiered poison pill that was adopted to fend off 
activists.132  The pill could be triggered by passive investors, those who 
disclose ownership by filing a Schedule 13G, when they acquired 20 
percent of the corporation.133  For all other investors who must disclose 
ownership by filing a Schedule 13D, including activists, the pill could be 
triggered when they acquired 10 percent of the corporation.134  The court 
specifically noted that this pill could combat the conscious parallelism that 
was part of wolf pack activism, which helped the court reach its decision.135  
 
 121. See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism:  
An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 691 (2007); Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 
1079. 
 122. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 286 
(2d Cir. 2011); Steven Davidoff Solomon, Anticlimax in Long-Running CSX Railroad Court 
Case, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K (July 19, 2011, 3:22 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2011/07/19/anticlimax-in-long-running-csx-court-case/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/F655-FAQ7]. 
 123. CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 284–85 (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 
49, 57 (1975)). 
 124. Id. at 285 (quoting Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 59). 
 125. Id. at 287 (citing Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 126. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 41–42. 
 127. See id. at 42. 
 128. See supra notes 65–74. 
 129. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 31–32. 
 131. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014). 
 132. Id. at *20. 
 133. See id. at *10. 
 134. See id.  The pill also features a one-year term and a “qualifying offer” exception. Id.  
The court noted that the pill discriminated against activists, but held it was legal regardless. 
Id. at *20. 
 135. See id.  Carmen X.W. Lu argues that the Third Point decision suggests that the two-
tiered pill limits even relatively loose wolf packs. Carmen X.W. Lu, Comment, Unpacking 
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This type of shareholders’ rights plan has become more common and has 
been used by corporations such as Sotheby’s and Netflix.136 
The two-tiered poison pill is not the only defense mechanism 
corporations may utilize to fight off wolf packs.  Latham & Watkins LLP 
has designed a “standing” poison pill, which uses broad language that 
applies to shareholders “acting in concert” or working “in conscious 
parallelism.”137  Additionally, Fried, Frank, Shriver & Jacobson LLP has 
reportedly developed a “window-closing” pill, whereby investors must file 
a Schedule 13D within a time frame much shorter than the ten-day window 
required by section 13(d).138  The window is shortened when investors pass 
a threshold ownership level of 5.1 percent.139  With new defensive 
mechanisms available for targeted corporations, it is more important than 
ever to adopt a structured formula to understand when a 13(d) group is 
formed. 
II.  SECTION 13(D) AND ANTITRUST LAW:  
CATEGORIES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
This part looks to judicial interpretations of group formation and price-
fixing conspiracies to show their similarities.  Part II.A surveys section 
13(d) precedent, and Part II.B investigates the use of circumstantial 
evidence in proving an agreement under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
A.  Section 13(d) Evidence of Group Activity 
Courts tend to assign different weight to different categories of section 
13(d) evidence.  Part II.A.1 analyzes parallel purchasing as evidence of 
13(d) group formation.  Part II.A.2 examines communication between 
alleged group members as circumstantial evidence.  Similarly, Part II.A.3 
evaluates representations to third parties that a group exists.  Part II.A.4 
investigates whether courts look to past relationships in 13(d) group cases.  
Part II.A.5 explores circumstantial evidence of actions taken to affect the 
corporate direction of the target company. 
 
Wolf Packs, 125 YALE L.J. 773, 780 (2016).  Lu writes that applying conscious parallelism 
to wolf packs risks overregulating activist hedge funds. Id. 
 136. See CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, M&A UPDATE:  DELAWARE COURT 
UPHOLDS SOTHEBY’S POISON PILL DEFENSE AGAINST ACTIVIST CITING “NEGATIVE CONTROL” 
AS A CORPORATE THREAT (2014), http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-
memos/delaware-upholds-sothebys-poison-pill-defense-against-activist-citing-negative-
control-as-a-corporate-threat [https://perma.cc/D7R8-MY9B]; see also Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, Netflix’s Poison Pill Has a Shareholder-Friendly Flavor, N.Y. TIMES:  DEALB%K 
(Nov. 6, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/netflixs-poison-pill-has-
a-shareholder-friendly-flavor/ [https://perma.cc/L2H4-HKGR]. 
 137. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 11, at 97 & n.240. 
 138. See id. at 97–98, 98 n.241. 
 139. See id. at 97–98.  Unlike the two-tiered poison pill, it is unclear whether these two 
newly developed pills would be valid, but should they be upheld they also would prove to be 
effective wolf pack defenses. See id. at 98 n.241. 
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1.  Parallel Purchasing and Selling of a Target’s Stock 
When courts decide issues of 13(d) group formation, they often look to 
whether defendants engaged in parallel acquisitions or sales of stock.  
Trading patterns among investors are circumstantial evidence of a group.140  
This is because the purpose of the Williams Act is to require disclosure by 
persons who have acquired a substantial interest in a company in a short 
period of time.141  It is important to note that not all trades must be “in 
sync” for parallel transactions to be strong evidence of coordination.142  In 
nearly every case where powerful evidence of parallel purchasing has 
existed, the court has held that a group was formed.143 
One example is the preeminent wolf pack group formation case, CSX 
Corp v. Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP.144  There, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the Sothern District of New York’s decision that 
activist hedge funds formed a group.145  The Southern District cited 
“parallel proxy fight preparations” and “parallel investments in the same 
company” as evidence of group formation in its decision.146  Judge Ralph 
K. Winter—in his concurring opinion—stated that the parallel conduct was 
the strongest evidence of group formation.147 
To constitute parallel purchasing, the transactions must occur over a 
relatively short period of time and involve a large number of shares.148  A 
short period of time amounts to purchases and sales within the same days or 
weeks.149  Transactions occurring over the course of a season or a month 
are too far apart to be considered parallel.150  Similarly, purchasing a near 
identical amount of a target’s shares evidences parallel purchasing.151  
Furthermore, courts have cited a lack of parallel transactions as a rationale 
 
 140. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 141. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1711, at 8 (1968), as reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 
2818. 
 142. Schaffer ex rel. Triton Energy Corp. v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233 (LMM), 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1994). 
 143. See Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 95–96 (1st Cir. 1977); Triton 
Energy Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *14, *16; Int’l Banknote Co. v. Muller, 713 
F. Supp. 612, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier Corp. 661 
F. Supp. 825, 832–34 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Breaud v. Amato, 657 So. 2d 1337, 1343–44 (La. Ct. 
App. 1995). But see Hallwood, 286 F.3d at 616, 618. 
 144. 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2011).  For the facts of this case, see infra notes 167–80 and 
accompanying text. 
 145. See CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 287–88, aff’g 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 146. CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. at 554, aff’d, 654 F.3d 276. 
 147. CSX Corp., 654 F.3d at 309 (Winter, J., concurring). 
 148. See Breaud, 657 So. 2d at 1343; cf. K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. 
Supp. 756, 766 (D. Colo. 1983). 
 149. See Schaffer ex rel. Triton Energy Corp. v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233 (LMM), 1994 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1994). 
 150. Cf. K-N Energy, Inc., 607 F. Supp. at 766. 
 151. See Gen. Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 95 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that a 
group was formed when three investors purchased identical blocks of stock simultaneously); 
Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc. v. Cormier Corp., 661 F. Supp. 825, 839 n.30 (N.D. Ill. 
1987) (noting that when two shareholders crossed the 5 percent threshold as a group, one 
owned 50,000 shares, and the other owned 50,025). 
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for finding that no group exists.152  Therefore, parallel purchasing or selling 
of a target’s stock is circumstantial evidence of a section 13(d) group. 
2.  Communication Between Purported “Group” Members 
Communication between group members has been analyzed in several 
different ways.  Part II.A.2.a focuses on communication between alleged 
group members about agreements and strategy.  Part II.A.2.b addresses 
discussions of the target’s value and purported group members’ holdings.  
Part II.A.2.c analyzes whether sharing information is circumstantial 
evidence.  Part II.A.2.d considers whether issuances of support for an 
activist campaign constitute evidence.  Part II.A.2.e examines 
communication regarding displeasure with incumbent management.  
Finally, Part II.A.2.f evaluates whether discussions to avoid triggering 
poison pills are circumstantial evidence of 13(d) group activity. 
a.  Communication Regarding Agreements and Strategy 
Where alleged group members discuss their agreement, the court likely 
will determine that a group was formed.  This type of communication has 
been evidence of group activity since the earliest 13(d) cases.153 
Perhaps the most obvious example of group formation occurred in 
Bender v. Jordan.154  There, a director who owned 21 percent of 
Independent Federal Savings Bank’s (IFSB) stock attempted to elect two 
new directors to IFSB’s board.155  The incumbent management fought the 
nominations by hiring a public relations firm to send letters to shareholders 
urging them to vote for the current board at the next shareholders’ 
meeting.156  Further, a friend of the directors purchased 7.2 percent of 
IFSB’s outstanding shares.157 
However, the directors’ most flagrant violation of section 13(d) was their 
plan to acquire a block of 9.47 percent of IFSB’s shares.158  Two 
shareholders owned this block:  one of them attended the meeting, and both 
of them intended to vote for the minority slate.159  At 11:00 p.m. on the 
night before the shareholder meeting, the directors contacted the attending 
shareholder and offered to purchase his shares at a premium, conditioned on 
his vote for the incumbent management.160  The day of the meeting, the 
incumbent directors brought the shareholder to an expensive restaurant.161  
There, the incumbent directors convinced him and the nonattending 
shareholder to sell their block, conditioned on their vote for the incumbents’ 
 
 152. See Dreiling v. Am. Online Inc., 578 F.3d 995, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 153. See, e.g., Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 106, 111 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 154. 439 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 155. See id. at 145, 147. 
 156. See id. at 149–50. 
 157. See id. at 152. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. at 153. 
 160. See id. at 152–53. 
 161. See id. at 153. 
2352 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
slate later that day.162  The same friend who had purchased 7.2 percent of 
IFSB’s shares agreed to purchase the block through a defendant-director to 
avoid Office of Thrift Supervision163 oversight.164  Several hours later, the 
block voted for the incumbent directors, who then won the proxy contest.165  
The court held that the directors’ communications and subsequent scheme 
to acquire a block of IFSB stock an hour before the shareholder meeting 
evidenced the creation of a 13(d) group.166 
Another case where defendants discussed agreements is CSX Corp.167  In 
CSX Corp., two hedge funds—the Children’s Investment Fund 
Management (TCI) and 3G Capital (3G)—coordinated purchases of CSX 
Corporation stock to effectuate corporate governance changes and, 
eventually, a proxy contest.168  TCI and 3G purchased cash-settled total-
return equity swaps (TRSs) with various banks referencing CSX shares.169  
Both TCI and 3G were aware that the banks, who were the “short” parties 
to the TRSs, would likely purchase stakes in CSX that were approximately 
equal to the size of the TRSs.170  Through TRSs and common stock, TCI 
acquired approximately 14.1 percent of CSX, and 3G purchased 4.9 
percent.171 
The hedge funds began communicating in January 2007 when TCI sent a 
fund under 3G’s control, which invested in TCI, a letter detailing 
information about the industries in which TCI was investing, including 
“U.S. transportation.”172  Alex Behring, 3G’s Managing Partner, contacted 
Chris Hohn, the Manager of TCI, to acquire more information.173  In their 
discussions, Hohn disclosed that TCI had invested in CSX.174  Additionally, 
the court found that Hohn revealed the size of TCI’s stake in CSX.175  
Shortly after the talks, 3G also began purchasing shares in CSX while 
remaining in communication with Hohn by email.176  By February 22, the 
two funds took a break from their purchasing until their managers met in 
person on March 29.177  Later that day, 3G began purchasing more CSX 
 
 162. See id. at 153–54. 
 163. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) is “the primary federal regulator of all 
federal and state-chartered savings institutions across the nation that belong to the Savings 
Association Insurance Fund (SAIF).” About, OFF. THRIFT SUPERVISION, https:// 
www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/ots.aspx (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [https://perma. 
cc/CH6B-XEDB]. 
 164. See Bender, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 153. 
 165. See id. at 154–55. 
 166. See id. at 162. 
 167. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 168. See id. at 280. 
 169. See id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 526, 
532 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 654 F.3d 276. 
 172. See id. at 533. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 534. 
2016] THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM OF WOLF PACKS 2353 
stock, which continued until April 18; during those three weeks, TCI 
acquired a larger stake in CSX as well.178 
On December 19, 2007, the two hedge funds filed a Schedule 13D 
disclosing that they were a group and stating their intention to nominate a 
minority slate of directors to CSX’s board.179  The Second Circuit held that 
TCI and 3G, through their communications and coordinated interests, had 
actually formed a group on April 10, 2007, when their combined stakes in 
CSX crossed the 5 percent threshold, thereby requiring section 13(d) 
disclosure.180  This case provides another example where communicating 
about agreements is strong evidence of group formation. 
Discussions of strategy often serve as the circumstantial, informal, and 
unwritten evidence needed to sufficiently prove the existence of a 13(d) 
group.  The District Court of Maryland held that family-member 
shareholders constituted a 13(d) group because they held daily conference 
calls to discuss their investment in and stock manipulation of a target 
company.181  Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that 
a 13(d) group existed from evidence of, inter alia, discussions between 
shareholders about nominating directors and officers as they took control of 
a target.182  The Southern District of California held that a shareholder 
formed a group when he spoke to a foreign investment fund about replacing 
an entire board with a proxy contest.183  To avoid a poison pill’s trigger 
threshold, he negotiated—and eventually came to a deal—with the fund to 
acquire stock on its behalf for the purpose of controlling the target 
corporation.184  Additionally, the Southern District of New York held that a 
group was formed when the manager of a private equity firm communicated 
with the principal of a hedge fund regarding the merits of amending a 
preferred stock agreement and decided their positions in upcoming 
negotiations.185 
However, discussing strategy does not always equate group formation.  
Communications between investors regarding strategy, subsequent to a 
successful effort to change management, have not been deemed evidence of 
group activity.186  Further, in Third Point LLC, a director nominee—
 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. at 535–36. 
 180. CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 181. Burt v. Maasberg, No. ELH-12-0464, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41982, at *59–61 (D. 
Md. Mar. 28, 2014). 
 182. SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 183. Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichenstein, No. 96-0039-B(AJB), 1996 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 22362, at *9–10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 1996). 
 184. See id. 
 185. See Schaffer ex rel. Lasersight Inc. v. CC Invs., LDC, No. 99 Civ. 2821 (VM), 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24511, at *14–18 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2002). 
 186. See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613, 618 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Transcript of Partial Testimony at 262, Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 95 F. 
Supp. 2d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 12LGHal1) [hereinafter Hallwood Mahowald 
Testimony].  There, it was Bill Ackman, a notorious hedge fund activist and the manager of 
Pershing Square Capital, who inquired about strategy. See id.; Katrina Brooker, Love Him or 
Hate Him, Ackman Now Runs the World’s Top Hedge Fund, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Jan. 6, 
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nominated by activist funds as part of a proxy contest—communicated his 
go-private plan to the lead wolf and attempted to recruit additional investors 
to back his plan.187  The court never questioned whether the wolf pack 
constituted a group.188  Therefore, while communications between 
shareholders regarding strategy do not automatically render them a group, 
the courts generally have required these investors jointly to file Schedule 
13Ds. 
b.  Communication Regarding Value of 
and Holding Size in Target Company 
Conversations about value and holding sizes, independent of strategy and 
agreements, are less likely to constitute circumstantial evidence of group 
activity.  The Second Circuit seems to have held that discussions regarding 
the value of a target’s shares are not sufficient evidence to prove group 
formation, standing alone.189  In Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham 
Partners,190 the Vice President of an alleged group member shared 
investment information about the target’s value with a potential investor.191  
This discussion of value and holdings did not persuade the Second Circuit 
that a group existed.192 
In CSX Corp., the Southern District of New York held that a group was 
formed when two hedge fund managers stayed in touch for almost six 
months to discuss their valuations of the target and thoughts on the 
investment, despite having filed Schedule 13Ds independently.193  The 
Second Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that these discussions, along 
with evidence of parallel stock acquisitions, were sufficient to form a 
group.194  It is unclear whether the Second Circuit began to place greater 
significance on this type of conversation in the time between Hallwood 
Realty Partners and CSX Corp.  However, the decisions suggest that 
discussions about value and holding size in a target company are not, 
standing alone, enough to constitute a 13(d) group. 
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 188. See generally Third Point LLC, 2014 WL 1922029. 
 189. See e.g., Hallwood Realty Partners, 286 F.3d at 618; see also Hallwood Mahowald 
Testimony, supra note 186, at 258. 
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 191. See id. at 617.  There, Ackman told another investor his valuation of the target 
company, the approximate size of Gotham’s holding, and the identity of other large 
shareholders. Hallwood Mahowald Testimony, supra note 186, at 258–62. 
 192. See Hallwood Realty Partners, 286 F.3d at at 618; see also infra Part II.A.2.d 
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c.  Sharing Information 
Activists who have taken a position in a target company generally may 
share information about that company with other potential investors and 
current shareholders.  Courts have held that investors seeking changes in a 
target corporation could share information without forming a group.195  
Further, in K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co.,196 the court held that 
when shareholders hold significant stock in a corporation, it may be 
understood that they share information with each other without any 
intention to form a group.197  Additionally, shareholders may distribute 
information to other investors with the hope of gaining their support in an 
activist campaign.198 
Sharing nonpublic information is actually in an activist hedge fund’s best 
interest to gain allies to back its campaign199 and is considered common 
practice.200  Wolf pack members shared information with other hedge funds 
in CSX Corp.201  In that case, prior to investing in CSX, TCI made 
presentations regarding an investment in CSX.202  The court held that a 
group was formed after finding that these pitches were intended to attract 
hedge funds favorable to TCI’s efforts.203 
Courts have found that sharing information about target companies, 
along with other communications, is evidence of group formation.204  
However, this is far from the common trend.205  This category of evidence 
has become more important as hedge funds waging public campaigns 
increasingly have shared information publicly.206 
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at 284. 
 203. See CSX Corp., 562 F. Supp. 2d at 525. 
 204. See Schaffer ex rel. Triton Energy Corp. v. Soros, No. 92 Civ. 1233 (LMM), 1994 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1994). 
 205. See, e.g., Burt v. Maasberg, No. ELH-12-0464, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41982, at 
*53–54 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2014). 
 206. See Alexandra Stevenson, Activist Investors Get a Welcome Seat at the Table, N.Y. 
TIMES:  DEALB%K (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/dealbook/ 
activist-investors-get-a-welcome-seat-at-the-table.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FJB7-W9FQ].  
Hedge funds do this by speaking to the media, creating websites, or writing letters to 
management in their public filings. Id. 
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d.  Communication Regarding Support 
for an Activist Campaign 
Issuances of support for lead wolves are evidence of group activity, but 
hold little weight.  In Hallwood Realty Partners, the Second Circuit held 
that no 13(d) group existed among shareholders who sought to remove the 
general partner of Hallwood.207  Gotham, a hedge fund managed by Bill 
Ackman, led the campaign by acquiring 14.82 percent of Hallwood’s 
stock.208  Gotham was joined by Interstate, a registered financial advisor, 
Private Management Group, Inc. (PMG), an investment manager, and EFO 
Liberty, Inc. (EFO), a realty investment company.209  Interstate acquired 9 
percent of Hallwood’s shares, PMG amassed 6.5 percent of Hallwood’s 
stock, and EFO purchased 2 percent of Hallwood.210  Throughout the 
campaign, a PMG representative contacted Ackman and Interstate’s 
manager to share that PMG would support actions to “realize value.”211 
Similarly, in MeVC Draper Fisher Jurvetson Fund I, Inc. v. Millennium 
Partners,212 Millennium, a real estate investment firm, and Karpus, a 
registered investment advisor, sought to replace a venture capital fund’s 
entire board in a proxy fight.213  During the campaign, Millennium acquired 
6.7 percent of the target’s shares, while Karpus bought 3.9 percent.214  Over 
ten months, Karpus representatives emailed Millennium six times and 
called it once about its investment.215  In most of these emails, Karpus 
informed Millennium of its general support for Millennium’s efforts to 
upend the target’s board.216  The court held that these communications did 
not sufficiently allege the existence of a 13(d) group.217 
In a recent Delaware Chancery Court case, a hedge fund and the 
Institutional Shareholder Services218 issued statements supporting a lead 
wolf’s slate of directors in a proxy battle.219  The court did not address the 
issue of whether the hedge funds were a group.220  Similarly, the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania held that expressions of support, even when paired 
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 220. See Third Point LLC, 2014 WL 1922029, at *1. 
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with communicating dissatisfaction with management, does not make 
investors a 13(d) group.221  Conversely, the Seventh Circuit held that 
investors who expressed support for a shareholder’s plan to change 
management were part of a group.222  These cases stand for the proposition 
that communicating support for an activist campaign is circumstantial, 
although weak, evidence of 13(d) group activity. 
e.  Communication Regarding Displeasure 
with Incumbent Management 
Discussions among shareholders who voice their dissatisfaction with a 
target’s current management likely are not enough, standing alone, to form 
a 13(d) group.  Generally, courts have declined to find group formation 
resting on this evidence.223  As stated in Part II.A.2.d, even criticism of 
management paired with issuances of support is not enough to form a 
group.224  Like evidence of support, communicating displeasure with 
incumbent management has been evidence of group formation in prior case 
law.225  However, it is clear that this evidentiary category is entitled to little 
weight.226 
f.  Communication to Avoid Triggering Poison Pills 
Discussions among shareholders to avoid triggering poison pills have not 
been held to be evidence of 13(d) group activity.  In Third Point LLC, Third 
Point, an activist hedge fund managed by Dan Loeb, a prominent activist 
investor, purchased shares in Sotheby’s.227  Third Point planned to take 
Sotheby’s private and replace its directors with Loeb and his allies.228  
Subsequently, a wolf pack was formed when two other hedge funds, 
Marcato Capital Management LLC (“Marcato”) and Trian Fund 
Management, L.P. (“Trian”) also purchased stock in Sotheby’s.229  Third 
Point and Marcato eventually filed and amended separate Schedule 13Ds 
until Third Point held 9.62 percent of Sotheby’s shares and Marcato owned 
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6.61 percent.230  Additionally, Trian acquired approximately 3 percent of 
Sotheby’s outstanding shares.231  Other hedge funds, such as York Capital 
Management and Eton Park Capital Management joined the wolf pack by 
acquiring Sotheby’s stock during this time.232 
After the funds acquired significant positions in Sotheby’s, Third Point’s 
Chief Operating Officer met with Marcato’s General Counsel to ensure that 
the funds “didn’t do anything to inadvertently trigger the pill.”233  This 
resulted in “some, but not extensive” communications between the two 
hedge funds.234  The court in Third Point LLC affirmed the legality of using 
the two-tiered poison pill to ward off activist campaigns addressed in Part 
I.D of this Note.235  However, the court ignored a potential section 13(d) 
issue, which implies that a group was not formed in this case.236  Similarly, 
in Hallwood Realty Partners, defendant-shareholders discussed a target’s 
poison pill.237  However, the court held that no group was formed.238  These 
cases show that communication about poison pills, without further 
discussions, does not require investors to disclose group membership under 
section 13(d). 
3.  Representations to Outside Parties 
That a Group Was Formed 
Courts assign different weights to evidence that defendants 
communicated with third parties.  Part II.A.3.a analyzes whether 
referencing that a “group” was formed is circumstantial evidence of an 
agreement.  Part II.A.3.b examines the extent to which representations that 
individually owned shares are part of a “block” qualifies as evidence of 
group activity. 
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a.  Referencing a “Group” to a Third Party 
Courts tend to find that a group has been formed where there is evidence 
that defendants represented that they were a “group” to third parties.  An 
example of this occurred when a shareholder publicly stated that a “group” 
was formed with the intent to take control of a target.239  Similarly, where 
four directors sought to acquire their corporation with a shell company and 
filed a joint Schedule 13D to that end, the court held that the directors 
violated section 13(d) by not filing earlier.240  The court held that the 
defendants formed a group when they revealed their takeover plan to the 
remaining directors at a board meeting.241  Finally, where a letter to a 
corporation’s stock transfer agent represented that a group of individuals 
had purchased warrants from a single issuer on the same date, the court held 
that this was sufficient proof of group formation.242 
However, several courts have held that no group existed in cases where 
defendants represented themselves as a “group.”  In Transcon Lines v. A.G. 
Becker, Inc.,243 Becker Warburg Paribus Group Inc. (BWP), a securities 
broker, sought to acquire an interest in Transcon with the help of Jerry G. 
Rubenstein, a controlling shareholder of shipping and management 
companies.244  Rubenstein and BWP met with many major corporations, 
seeking additional funding for the acquisition.245  In each meeting, the 
potential investors were told that Rubenstein would be involved in 
Transcon’s future management.246  This was reflected in a number of 
internal documents that included Transcon financial projections with 
references to Rubenstein and his associates’ involvement in 
management.247  Other documents stated that “Rubenstein-BWP,” a 
partnership between Rubenstein and BWP, would be part of the 
acquisition.248  Despite these representations, the court held that Rubenstein 
was not part of a group with BWP because he was not a beneficial owner of 
Transcon stock, and the group disclosed him as an advisor in their Schedule 
13D.249 
Similarly, in Hallwood Realty Partners, where several hedge funds and 
investment advisors sought to remove a target company’s general partner, 
the target hired a private investigator (PI) to gather evidence of group 
activity from alleged group members.250  One of the defendants told the PI, 
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who was posing as a prospective investor, that a “Gotham-led group 
designed to take over” the target existed.251  Another defendant gave the PI 
investment materials about the target that “could be read to imply that [the 
defendant-investment advisor] was part of a Gotham-led attempt . . . to take 
over [the target] and to ‘realize value.’”252  The court held that this 
circumstantial evidence was not enough to find that a group had been 
formed.253  Transcon Lines and Hallwood Realty Partners stand for the 
proposition that in some cases, defendants’ representations alone that a 
“group” exists is not enough to prove 13(d) group formation. 
b.  Representations That Shares 
Owned by Individuals Are Part of a “Block” 
The Fifth Circuit held that a mark of group formation is statements to 
outside parties by group members “that its members together ‘control’ a 
block of shares, even though those shares are on the record of the company 
as owned by individual group members.”254  District courts have expressed 
this sentiment as well.255 
In Wellman v. Dickinson,256 defendant-shareholders sought to interest 
major corporations to acquire a minority interest in a target to affect a 
complete takeover.257  The defendant made identical presentations to 
several companies, whereby stocks owned by one of the defendants, a 
brokerage house, and the defendants’ friends were advertised as a “block” 
that “would provide a sufficient base from which to launch a more 
extensive acquisition” of the target’s shares.258  The court relied on these 
representations to potential investors as proof of a 13(d) group.259  
Overwhelming precedent shows that statements that shares owned by 
individuals are part of a “block” is evidence of a 13(d) group.260 
4.  Past Relationships Indicative of a “Group” 
The majority of courts do not consider past relationships between 
defendants when deciding the issue of 13(d) group formation.  In Texasgulf, 
Inc. v. Canada Development Corporation,261 the Southern District of Texas 
formulated the prevailing rule that “[m]ere relationship[s], among persons 
or entities, whether family, personal[,] or business, [are] insufficient to 
create a group which is deemed to be a statutory person. There must be [an] 
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2016] THE CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM OF WOLF PACKS 2361 
agreement to act in concert.”262  Most courts have adopted this rule 
verbatim when faced with similar section 13(d) questions.263  Still others 
convey this same principle with different language.264 
Further, courts generally show no bias in considering the type of 
relationship between defendants as evidence of group formation.  This lack 
of bias is illustrated by courts’ holdings in different cases that a group did 
or did not exist when the relationship at issue was between friends,265 
family,266 clients,267 coworkers,268 or colleagues from separate 
companies.269  Interestingly, the Southern District of New York has 
recently stated that an employer-employee relationship is not indicative of 
group membership either.270  Further, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
has declared that being Facebook “friends” is not significant to group 
formation.271 
Although courts generally show no preference regarding the type of 
relationship between defendants, this does not prevent some courts from 
placing significance on evidence of prior relationships.  For example, the 
District Court of Maryland, in Burt v. Maasberg,272 adopted the Texasgulf 
rule,273 but then stated that past relationships are circumstantial evidence 
that may be used to show group membership.274  Additionally, the Northern 
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District of Texas has contemplated prior relationships while determining 
group formation.275 
The Southern District of New York has been inconsistent in considering 
prior relationships as evidence of group activity, and the Second Circuit has 
done little to clear up the confusion.  Most Southern District cases 
contemplating the issue have applied the Texasgulf rule and have not used 
relationships as evidence.276  However, Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the 
Southern District has implied that “pre-existing common relationship[s]” 
are a relevant consideration in determining group formation.277  
Additionally, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, also of the Southern District, has 
twice considered relationships between shareholders as evidence in 
deciding group membership.278  The Second Circuit has not explicitly 
approved the use of prior relationships as circumstantial evidence, but it has 
addressed it before.279  In Hallwood Realty Partners, the Second Circuit 
seemingly signed off on Judge Kaplan’s consideration of past relationships 
as evidence of a group.280  And in CSX Corp., the majority opinion did not 
address this issue, but Judge Winter’s concurrence stated that the 
relationship between the defendants was evidence of group formation.281  
Nonetheless, Judge Winter cautioned that this evidence should be balanced 
by the idea that it is “an explanation for frequent conversations that do not 
involve [the target].”282  Therefore, a discrepancy exists between whether 
past relationships are circumstantial evidence at all. 
5.  Actions Taken to Affect the 
Corporate Direction of the Target Company 
Some courts use “action[s] taken by the group to affect the corporate 
direction of the company” as evidence of group formation.283  An example 
of an activity undertaken to affect the corporate direction of a target that 
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was sufficient enough to be evidence of a group occurred when activist 
shareholders vetoed a profitable offer to purchase a company.284  Further, 
efforts to direct a target into a new industry have constituted evidence of 
group activity.285  Finally, seeking a company to effectuate a takeover of a 
target corporation has been sufficient evidence to warrant a holding that 
shareholders were a group.286  Although it is considered infrequently, 
conduct to affect a target’s direction is evidence of a 13(d) group. 
B.  Proving an Agreement by Circumstantial Evidence 
Under the Sherman Antitrust Act 
As noted in Part I.C, courts making Williams Act determinations do not 
follow a defined set of factors.  Looking to the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
which contains a more rigid and developed factor-based system of analysis, 
can guide courts through group formation cases alleging section 13(d) 
violations. 
To prevent cartel price-fixing schemes, section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act makes “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce . . . illegal.”287  Congress intended this statute to ensure that 
business markets remained competitive.288  Antitrust litigation often 
focuses on whether defendants formed an agreement.289  Beginning in the 
twentieth century, the Supreme Court developed the “agreement” issue by 
defining concerted action.290  In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,291 
the Court stated that an “agreement . . . [is] not a prerequisite to an unlawful 
conspiracy.  It [is] enough that, knowing that concerted action [is] 
contemplated and invited, the distributors [give] their adherence to the 
scheme and participate[] in it.”292  Further, a competitor’s acceptance of a 
plan, without a formal agreement, is enough to form a conspiracy under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.293  A decade later, the Supreme Court echoed 
this rule, holding that “it is not necessary to find an express agreement in 
order to find a conspiracy.  It is enough that a concert of action is 
contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the arrangement.”294  
Therefore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly looked to circumstantial 
evidence in price-fixing cases. 
More recently, in Monsanto Co v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,295 the Court 
held that evidence must exist that “tends to exclude the possibility of 
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independent action.”296  This requires “direct or circumstantial evidence” to 
prove that that parties “had a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme.”297  The “tends to exclude” standard was significant because the 
Court sought to prevent the mistaken interpretations of conspiracy that 
would deter companies from offering low prices and thereby hurt 
consumers.298 
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the key question in antitrust 
cases is “whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct stem[s] from 
independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.”299  Proving 
the existence of an agreement by direct evidence is rare; far more often, an 
agreement is shown through circumstantial evidence.300  Using 
circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs generally must show that defendants 
acted in conscious parallelism.301  Conscious parallelism means that 
companies intentionally espouse the practices of their competitors.302  
Showing conscious parallelism requires plaintiffs to prove two elements:  
that defendants engaged in similar acts and that they were conscious of their 
actions.303  Evidence of conscious parallelism does not require that pricing 
be uniform; price changes may occur nonsimultaneously and need not be 
the same between competitors.304 
The Supreme Court held that allegations of conscious parallelism are not 
enough to prove a conspiracy, standing alone.305  Plaintiffs must also prove 
plus factors—evidence that “tends to exclude” the probability that 
defendants acted independently.306  Generally, more than one plus factor 
must be shown to prove that a conspiracy exists.307  Courts are given broad 
discretion to determine plus factors,308 as there is no all-inclusive list.309  
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Given that plus factors still can be somewhat ambiguous, it can be difficult 
to prove concerted action in the antitrust context.310 
This section focuses on nine common plus factors:  the eight common 
plus factors that the American Bar Association (ABA) has identified—(1)  
“actions against the defendant’s independent self-interest,” (2)  “motive to 
conspire,” (3)  “opportunity to conspire,” (4)  “market concentrations and 
structure,” (5)  “pretextual explanations for anticompetitve conduct,” (6)  
“sharing of price information,” (7)  “signaling,” and (8)  “involvement in 
other conspiracies”311—as well as legal scholars Phillip E. Areeda and 
Herbert Hovenkamp’s plus factor, (9)  “customary indications of traditional 
conspiracy.”312 
The plus factor “actions against the defendant’s independent self-
interest” is evidence of a conspiracy when an action would be against a 
company’s interest acting independently, but would be in its interest while 
acting in a conspiracy.313  This plus factor is important because its presence 
generally removes the risk of misidentifying a competitive market as a 
cartel.314  An example of this plus factor evincing a conspiracy is two 
companies abstaining from competing to steal each other’s customers.315  
Despite this, courts recognize that actions against a company’s self-interest 
are sometimes only a sign of interdependence.316 
Like conduct against a defendant’s independent self-interest, the plus 
factor “motive to conspire” is important because its existence lessens the 
chance of mistaking a noncompetitive market as competitive.317  However, 
courts are skeptical of this plus factor, so it is rarely alleged standing 
alone.318  This skepticism is due to motivation to conspire being 
synonymous with interdependence.319  For this reason, courts hold that 
oligopolists may raise their prices with the hope that others will follow, 
without giving rise to an inference of conspiracy.320  Further, to be a plus 
factor, the defendant’s motive must be more than a wish to increase 
profits.321 
 
 310. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 44, at 1079. 
 311. Id.; ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 69–91. 
 312. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW:  AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1434b, at 267–68 (3d ed. 2010).  This 
Note will not focus on Judge Richard A. Posner’s suggested plus factors because they 
generally pertain to price fixing specifically, however the ABA addresses some of his 
factors. See POSNER, supra note 302, at 79–93. 
 313. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 69–70. 
 314. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 312, at 265–66. 
 315. See Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1244–46 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
 316. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 312, at 269–70. 
 317. See id. at 265. 
 318. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 74. 
 319. See id. 
 320. See, e.g., In re Dig. Music Antitrust Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d 435, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 321. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 74. 
2366 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
“Opportunity to conspire” generally means meetings or conversations 
between defendants.322  Oftentimes, plaintiffs allege this plus factor when 
defendants attend the same trade association meetings,323 although this plus 
factor is given little weight.324  The Supreme Court dismissed the 
proposition that membership in the same trade association was, standing 
alone, a sufficient plus factor to evidence a conspiracy.325  Lower courts 
have echoed this sentiment for several decades.326  Nonetheless, if alleged 
with other plus factors, many courts still believe it is circumstantial 
evidence of a conspiracy.327 
The Supreme Court has stated that the “structure of the industry” is one 
of the “most prominent[]” factors used to identify a conspiracy.328  While 
this plus factor, standing alone, is not enough to prove conspiracy, 
combined with other plus factors, it is probative evidence.329  Judge 
Richard A. Posner also recognizes “market concentration and structure” as 
evidence of conspiracy:  he argues that “fixed relative market shares” is 
proof of noncompetitiveness.330  This plus factor is particularly evincing of 
a conspiracy in sell-side markets.331  Nonetheless, courts generally hold that 
just because a market is an oligopoly does not necessarily mean that there 
has been a conspiracy.332  To prove that a market’s concentration and 
structure are susceptible to collusion, plaintiffs must show a market is 
concentrated and has “fungible products subject to inelastic demand.”333 
Evidence of “pretextual explanations for anticompetitive conduct” refutes 
the possibility of independent action.334  An illustration of a pretextual 
explanation that can serve as a plus factor is a defendant’s explanation for 
refusing to sell a product because of a distributorship agreement, followed 
by an explanation that the refusal was not because of an agreement, but 
because the defendant had a policy not to sell products outside its 
territory.335  However, this plus factor alone generally is insufficient to 
show a conspiracy.336 
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“Sharing of price information,” in certain situations, is strong 
circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy.337  However, the Supreme Court 
held that sharing price data is not a per se violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act338 because exchanging information also can indicate 
competitive action.339  But systems of price sharing are more likely to be 
evidence of a conspiracy,340 so long as evidence that defendants agreed to 
fix prices also exists.341  The Court did not explain a “system” beyond the 
facts of the case, but Merriam-Webster defines “system” as “a group of 
related parts that move or work together.”342  Lower courts have held that 
systems of price sharing can refer to the authority level of the 
representatives of each defendant exchanging information.343  Where the 
price sharing occurs at higher levels, it is more indicative of a conspiracy 
than an exchange between employees, who do not have the authority to 
make pricing decisions.344  Significantly, in examining price sharing, courts 
will also look to whether there is a “legitimate, nonpretextual business 
rationale” for the exchange to rebut allegations of conspiracy.345 
The plus factor “signaling” occurs when companies transmit pricing 
information or competitive plans to their coconspirators through indirect 
communications, including third parties and the media.346  Sometimes, 
conferences with industry analysts have proved to be evidence of the 
signaling plus factor.347  However, in Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris 
USA,348 the Eleventh Circuit held that no conspiracy existed when a 
defendant’s CEO announced the defendant’s plan to adopt a strategy other 
than price reductions at a conference with stock analysts.349  Two reasons 
for the holding, among others, were that:  “in an oligopoly, each company is 
aware of the others’ actions,” and the announcements neither eliminated the 
chance of independent action nor substantiated a price-fixing conspiracy.350  
Under the signaling plus factor, courts scrutinize price increase 
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announcements that occur far before changes are implemented.351  
However, like the “sharing price information” plus factor, defendants can 
rebut this scrutiny by showing a legitimate business rationale for their 
announcements.352 
While plaintiffs have alleged that “involvement in other conspiracies” 
should be considered in antitrust cases, courts are skeptical of this plus 
factor’s usefulness.353  Further, the Supreme Court stated that “a 
conspiracy . . . in one market does not tend to show a conspiracy” in other 
markets if the “conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible 
explanations.”354  Therefore, this plus factor provides little strength to 
plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations. 
The plus factor “customary indications of traditional conspiracy” refers 
to proof that alleged conspirators met and “exchanged assurances of 
common action or otherwise adopted a common plan even though no 
meetings, conversations, or exchanged documents are shown.”355  This plus 
factor has led at least one court to infer a conspiracy existed when 
defendants had simultaneous meetings and then implemented a set formula 
for bidding on contracts.356  This plus factor also sufficiently proved a 
conspiracy where defendants exchanged salary information and assured 
each other that they were going to rely on that information.357  “Customary 
indications of traditional conspiracy” provide strong circumstantial 
evidence of conspiracy. 
While these plus factors are not bright-line rules, they have proven to be 
a sufficient framework in price-conspiracy cases.  The strength of antitrust 
conspiracy law is demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s continued reliance 
on conscious parallelism and plus factors. 
III.  SECTION 13(D) GROUP FORMATION SHOULD BE 
ANALYZED USING THE ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY FRAMEWORK 
This part argues that 13(d) group formation cases should be examined 
under the antitrust conspiracy framework.  Part III.A suggests that the 
antitrust precedent of conscious parallelism should be adopted as the first 
element in determining that a wolf pack forms a 13(d) group.  Part III.B 
evaluates antitrust plus factors and 13(d) group evidence to propose plus 
factors that should be used in section 13(d) cases. 
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A.  Adopting the Conscious Parallelism Standard 
As the First Element in a Wolf Pack Group Formation Rule 
While there currently is no “checklist” of factors to determine 13(d) 
group formation,358 the substantial increase in hedge fund activism, 
specifically the wolf pack tactic,359 requires the development of a clearer 
rule.  The conscious parallelism and plus factor standard of circumstantial 
evidence from antitrust law provides the more certain solution that section 
13(d) needs. 
Rule 13d-5(b)(1) states that a 13(d) “group” is formed “[w]hen two or 
more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, 
voting or disposing of . . . securities.”360  Similarly, section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act makes “[e]very contract . . . or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce . . . illegal.”361  The Supreme Court held that 
in deciding whether a conspiracy exists, the key question is “whether the 
challenged anticompetitive conduct stem[s] from independent decision or 
from an agreement, tacit or express.”362  Both the 13(d) and antitrust 
standards require an agreement to be formed. 
Quintel Entertainment, the preeminent 13(d) group case, states that an 
agreement can be “formal or informal.”363  Further, group members must 
only “combine[] to further a common objective” regarding “acquiring, 
holding, voting, or disposing of . . . securities”—specific terms are 
unnecessary.364  Likewise, antitrust conspiracies only require that a concert 
of action be intended and that defendants conformed to the understanding; 
they do not require an express agreement.365  Both standards essentially 
require a “meeting of the minds.”366  Additionally, both rules may be 
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.367 
Conscious parallelism is implicit in both standards.  The wolf pack tactic 
requires parallel investing strategies, usually ones that involve buying up a 
target’s stock in a short window of time.368  And in antitrust law, “evidence 
of consciously parallel behavior . . . [has] made heavy inroads into the 
traditional attitude toward conspirac[ies].”369  Even the level of parallel 
behavior required is equivalent.  Under section 13(d), actors do not need to 
“march in lockstep,” and their parallel trades need not be “in sync” to be 
strong evidence of coordination.370  Antitrust conscious parallelism does 
 
 358. See supra text accompanying notes 112–13. 
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not require that pricing is uniform; price increases can occur 
asynchronously, and raised prices can differ.371 
In nearly every case where strong evidence of parallel purchasing was 
present, courts have held that a 13(d) group was formed.372  Further, in CSX 
Corp., the Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District of New York’s 
decision, which recognized parallel behavior as evidence of group 
activity.373  Circuit Judge Winter’s concurrence stated that the parallel 
conduct was the strongest evidence of group formation.374  Given conscious 
parallelism’s implicit role in wolf packs and courts’ willingness to treat this 
behavior as strong evidence of group formation, it seems natural to adopt it 
as the first element in a clearer rule. 
The Delaware Chancery Court has been willing to treat wolf packs 
differently than other investors in the past.  In Third Point LLC, the court 
noted that the two-tiered poison pill discriminated against activist 
shareholders, but held that it was still appropriate.375  Further, the court 
recognized that conscious parallelism was a fundamental part of the wolf 
pack strategy; this fact helped the court come to its decision.376 
The wolf pack strategy’s ability to evade traditional group formation has 
led the Delaware Chancery Court to treat wolf packs differently than 
traditional investors.  Similarly, the court may be willing to adopt the 
antitrust precedent in wolf pack group formation cases to address this 
loophole. 
Nevertheless, the antitrust-securities comparison is not perfect:  though it 
creates more certainty than the status quo 13(d) group formation analysis, 
the plus factors are not bright-line factors.377  But given the nature of the 
issue, it is unlikely any solution will get closer to an objective test.  
Moreover, judges have experience implementing the antitrust framework 
and thus could apply it adeptly to the section 13(d) context.  Further, it has 
been suggested that using conscious parallelism to determine group 
formation overestimates the extent of agreements among activist hedge 
funds, leading to the overregulation of wolf packs.378  However, this Note’s 
proposed plus factors seek to identify clear behavior that avoids 
overpunishing wolf packs.379  Therefore, this Note suggests that no plus 
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factor alone—except “customary indications of traditional conspiracy”380—
is enough to show that a wolf pack formed a group.381 
B.  Plus Factors to Serve As the Second Element in the 
Proposed Wolf Pack Group Formation Rule 
This section analyzes plus factors that could serve as the second element 
in the proposed 13(d) group formation rule.  Part III.B.1 suggests that 
several preexisting antitrust plus factors should be adopted in 13(d) group 
cases.  Part III.B.2 recommends applying previously used circumstantial 
evidence of group activity to the proposed section 13(d) plus factor 
analysis.  Finally, Part III.B.3 rejects certain antitrust plus factors that are 
irrelevant in 13(d) group formation cases. 
1.  Proposed Plus Factors to be Adopted from Antitrust Law 
Part III.B.1.a argues that the antitrust plus factor “opportunity to 
conspire” should be adopted in section 13(d) law.  Part III.B.1.b proposes 
that the plus factor “sharing of price information” deserves evidentiary 
weight as a 13(d) plus factor.  Part III.B.1.c suggests that the plus factor 
“signaling” is relevant to this consideration as well.  Finally, Part III.B.1.d 
notes the obvious benefits of adopting “customary indications of traditional 
conspiracy” as a section 13(d) plus factor. 
a.  Opportunity to Conspire 
In antitrust practice, “opportunity to conspire” is relevant where alleged 
conspirators meet or communicate.382  In the context of 13(d) group 
formation, these situations are more likely to occur when alleged group 
members have prior relationships.  Past relationships should be evidence of 
group activity because they create an opportunity to conspire. 
Most courts dealing with prior relationships cite the Texasgulf rule and 
do not seem to contemplate this factor while making group formation 
decisions.383  However, several courts—particularly two judges in the 
Southern District of New York—do consider this factor even though they 
also cite Texasgulf.384  To reconcile the discrepancies between the courts, 
prior relationships should be circumstantial, but weak, evidence of “group” 
membership.  The language of the Texasgulf rule—“mere 
relationship[s] . . . [are] insufficient to create a group”385—implies that, 
standing alone, this evidence is not enough to prove group formation.  The 
language leaves open the possibility of considering relationships as just one 
factor in this determination. 
 
 380. See infra Part III.B.1.d. 
 381. See infra Part III.B.1.a–c, III.B.2. 
 382. See ABA ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 76. 
 383. See supra text accompanying notes 262–63. 
 384. See supra text accompanying notes 274–78. 
 385. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Can. Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 403 (S.D. Tex. 1973). 
2372 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
However, courts analyzing this factor should also consider Judge 
Winter’s point that prior relationships may be “an explanation for frequent 
conversations that do not involve [the target].”386  Consideration that prior 
relationships often foster communication that is not just for investment 
reasons prevents relationships from being a sufficient plus factor to show a 
group was formed, on their own. 
In antitrust cases, plaintiffs often allege that defendants have an 
opportunity to conspire when they attend the same trade association 
meetings.387  Trade association meetings are similar to activist investor 
conferences; they give activist hedge funds an opportunity to meet and 
communicate about their investments.388  The Supreme Court’s holding that 
membership in a trade association is not, alone, a sufficient plus factor to 
show a conspiracy reinforces this proposed 13(d) group plus factor.389  Like 
prior relationships, attending activist conferences should be weak 
circumstantial evidence of group activity.  Due to its similarity to section 
13(d) case law, the antitrust evidence “opportunity to conspire” should be 
adopted as a plus factor in the wolf pack group formation framework. 
b.  Sharing of Price Information 
The plus factor “sharing of price information” should be circumstantial 
evidence of 13(d) group formation.  In antitrust law, systems of price 
sharing are likely to evince a conspiracy.390  The definition of “system” is a 
group that moves or works together.391  The same principle should apply in 
section 13(d) cases where there is additional evidence that an agreement 
took place.  Like antitrust precedent,392 arrangements whereby activist 
investors provide information to other activists upon request and an 
understanding exists that those activists will furnish data in return should 
certainly be considered in a court’s decision of group formation. 
Communication regarding value and holding size in a target and sharing 
information about a target are analogous to the antitrust “sharing of price 
information” plus factor.  However, courts are split on whether these types 
of communication are evidence of group activity.393  Therefore, this 
suggested plus factor in wolf pack 13(d) group formation cases should not 
be enough, standing alone, to prove the existence of an agreement. 
Courts hearing antitrust cases distinguish systems of information sharing 
between high-ranking employees from systems between low-ranking 
employees.394  In antitrust cases, higher-ups are management or employees 
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who have authority to make pricing decisions.395  In applying this 
distinction to hedge funds, it should be stronger evidence of price sharing if 
systems involve managers and analysts who have authority to make 
investment decisions.  Because sharing information is not a per se violation 
of antitrust or securities law,396 this plus factor, standing alone, should not 
be enough to prove group formation. 
In the context of hedge fund activism, this plus factor is appropriate 
because hedge funds invest large amounts of capital in target companies—
clearly the decisions by high-ranking members with this sort of authority 
are determinative.  An investor generally will seek to acquire as much 
information as possible about a corporation before purchasing stock, 
especially when making a large investment. 
In antitrust law, defendants can rebut the presumption of conspiracy 
created by exchanging price information if they show a legitimate, 
nonpretextual business reason for sharing.397  This is similar to the K-N 
Energy principle that significant shareholders may exchange information 
without forming a group.398  There, the defendant had a 7 percent stake in 
the target.399  By comparison, news of most activist hedge fund campaigns 
do not reach the public,400 which means that no wolves acquire more than 5 
percent of their target.  Thus, in the majority of activist campaigns, hedge 
funds will not be able to rebut the presumption of group activity created by 
sharing information because there is no documentation of earlier statements 
regarding the reason for business decisions.  In the rare situation that a wolf 
takes a 5 percent or larger stake—and must file Schedule 13Ds—the 
target’s board of directors will be aware of the activists’ presence and can 
inform shareholders accordingly, thus satisfying the purpose of section 
13(d).401  Whether the K-N Energy principle should apply to those activist 
hedge funds that reach 7 percent of a target’s stock should depend on 
whether the campaign will provide long-term value to the target.402  Despite 
this determination, communication about the value of and the holding size 
in a target and sharing information should fall under the “sharing 
information” plus factor in analyzing wolf pack group formation.  However, 
it must be alleged with other plus factors. 
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c.  Signaling 
“Signaling” has been alleged to be circumstantial evidence of price 
fixing, especially where defendants made announcements at conferences 
with industry analysts.403  Evidence of communicating support for 
campaigns, references that a “group” exists, and representing that shares 
owned by individual shareholders are part of a “block” have all been used 
as evidence in 13(d) group formation cases.404  These types of 
communications are analogous to “signaling” that an activist campaign 
exists.  Therefore, signaling should be a plus factor in determining 13(d) 
group membership.  However, as courts seemingly assign little weight to 
communications of support,405 this plus factor should not be enough, 
standing alone, to show group activity. 
In antitrust law, announcements at conferences with industry analysts are 
evidence of the plus factor “signaling.”406  This is similar to the antitrust 
practice of treating attendance at trade association meetings as 
circumstantial evidence under the “opportunity to conspire” plus factor.407  
For this reason, courts should hold that presentations at activist conferences 
are analogous to announcements at conferences with industry analysts.  In 
contrast, Williamson Oil Co. disregarded these announcements as evidence 
of price fixing.408  However, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning does not fit 
perfectly in securities law.  Its first rationale, “that in an oligopoly, each 
company is aware of the other’s actions,”409 is not relevant to wolf packs 
because they do not control the majority of a target’s shares.  However, the 
court’s second rationale is relevant because, like price fixing, presenting at 
activist conferences does not exclude the possibility of independent action 
nor establish that a group is formed.410  This further supports the contention 
that signaling, on its own, should not prove 13(d) group formation. 
Defendants can rebut the presumption of signaling as evidence of price 
fixing by showing there was a legitimate business rationale for their 
actions.411  Adopting this defense in section 13(d) cases would protect 
shareholders with ethical intentions.  Activist hedge fund campaigns 
targeting poorly run companies would be able to present evidence that their 
proposals would benefit the target—and hopefully provide long-term value.  
The only actors that would be barred from this defense are those taking part 
in activist campaigns against perfectly healthy and well-run targets; 
presumably these investors would have no excuse. 
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Adopting this plus factor in section 13(d) cases would have a substantial 
effect on wolf packs because tipping is an essential part of their strategy.412  
An argument that this plus factor hurts shareholders’ fundamental right to 
support better management decisions likely will fail.  Traditional activist 
shareholders—as apart from activist hedge funds—would benefit from 
disclosure because the issuer’s board, and presumably other shareholders, 
would be made aware of their campaign.  Further, this plus factor would not 
hurt traditional activists because they and their allies generally do not hold a 
5 percent stake in an issuer.413  It is more likely that this plus factor will 
apply to wolf packs than traditional investors.  By signaling instead of 
making express agreements, wolf packs circumvent section 13(d)’s 
disclosure requirements; thus, the law’s purpose is not being carried out.  
Activist hedge funds in a wolf pack with moral intentions still could plead 
the legitimate business rationale defense.  Therefore, signaling should be a 
plus factor in 13(d) group formation cases, but should be considered 
alongside other plus factors. 
d.  Customary Indications of Traditional Conspiracy 
“Customary indications of traditional conspiracy” is the most easily 
recognizable form of price-fixing evidence.  Similarly, evidence that wolf 
pack members adopted a common plan, regardless of whether a meeting 
took place, is easily recognizable.  In cases where there is evidence of 
communications about agreements and support, courts overwhelmingly 
hold that a 13(d) group is formed.414  Given that this evidence clearly shows 
group formation, it is the exact type of behavior that Congress believed 
should be disclosed.  Customary indications of traditional group formation 
should therefore be a plus factor that holds substantial weight. 
2.  Proposed Plus Factors from Section 13(d) Case Law 
Part III.B.2.a proposes using evidence of communicating dissatisfaction 
with management as a section 13(d) plus factor.  Part III.B.2.b suggests that 
discussions to avoid triggering a poison pill also should be a plus factor.  
Finally, Part III.B.2.c recommends that actions taken to affect the corporate 
direction of a target should be a 13(d) group plus factor. 
a.  Communication Regarding Displeasure 
with Incumbent Management 
Expressing dissatisfaction with management should be a plus factor 
because it is circumstantial evidence of group activity.415  Courts have 
declined to find that a 13(d) group was formed from evidence of this type of 
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communication, yet they have considered it in their decisions.416  
Nonetheless, displeasure with an issuer’s management neither discounts 
independent action nor substantiates group membership.  Further, 
disgruntled shareholders may not believe that an activist campaign provides 
a better alternative to current management decisions.  Dissatisfaction with 
management direction is implicit in all activism.  Therefore, it is weak 
circumstantial evidence. 
The nature of wolf packs—as compared to traditional shareholders—
requires that expressing dissatisfaction with incumbent management is a 
plus factor.  First, shareholders—like a wolf pack—that acquire 5 percent or 
more of an issuer have a louder voice than the traditional shareholder.  
Further, a fundamental part of a wolf pack is campaigning that its proposal 
is a better alternative to a target’s current management’s practices.  Because 
courts are willing to treat wolf packs differently than traditional 
shareholders, evidence that activist hedge funds express displeasure with a 
target’s management should be a plus factor, but it should still hold little 
weight. 
b.  Communication to Avoid Triggering Poison Pills 
Evidence that shareholders spoke to avoid triggering a poison pill should 
be a 13(d) group formation plus factor because it provides an opportunity to 
come to an agreement.  A shareholder would only buy a stake just short of 
triggering a pill if they intended to take control of the issuer.  However, 
courts must consider that shareholders with a stake this large would worry 
about a pill being triggered and, therefore, likely would believe it is 
necessary to communicate with other parties to protect their investment. 
In section 13(d) cases where plaintiffs cited this form of communication 
as evidence of group membership, courts did not address this factor in their 
analysis.417  One reason for this may be that a party close to the pill’s 
threshold would have already had to file a Schedule 13D.  This satisfies the 
purpose of section 13(d):  that the board of directors would be aware of the 
party’s stake and could advise other shareholders accordingly.418  Another 
reason is that a discussion to avoid triggering a poison pill with nothing 
more evinces that the parties are not fully aware of each other’s intentions.  
Therefore, while this form of communication should be a plus factor, it 
should be considered weak circumstantial evidence. 
c.  Actions Taken to Affect the 
Corporate Direction of the Target Company 
Actions to affect the corporate direction of a target should be a plus 
factor because they occur in all wolf packs.  Several courts have considered 
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these actions, on their own, to be evidence of group activity.419  In all of 
these cases, the actions taken were the same types that are sought by activist 
hedge fund campaigns.420 
This plus factor may seem too broad because taking actions to affect a 
corporation’s direction is implicit in all activism.  However, it is essential 
for shareholders to know about these actions to make informed decisions 
regarding their shares.  This is the exact type of knowledge that Congress 
intended shareholders to have.421  This plus factor is particularly relevant 
because wolf packs have recently had so much success in implementing 
changes.422  Therefore, this plus factor should be considered weak 
circumstantial evidence of group activity. 
3.  Rejection of Irrelevant Antitrust Plus Factors 
While Part III.B.1 of this Note reconciled the similarities between 
antitrust plus factors and 13(d) group evidence, some antitrust plus factors 
are irrelevant in the context of 13(d) group formation. 
The first unnecessary plus factor is “actions against self-interest.”  In 
antitrust cases, one common reason that plaintiffs are unable to prove a 
conspiracy exists is that the defendant’s acts may not necessarily be against 
their own self-interest, and thus, the evidence would not meet Monsanto’s 
“tend to exclude” standard.423  This same rationale is present in all hedge 
fund activism:  all hedge funds share the same interest in making a profit.  
When a normal actor invests in a poorly run company, one may be able to 
show that the investment was not in the actor’s interest.  However, activist 
hedge funds seek out poorly run companies, so it becomes difficult to show 
that an investment is not in a hedge fund’s interest.  Even if it were possible 
to show this, in corporate law, courts employ the business judgment rule to 
give deference to board business decisions because courts operate under the 
assumption that judges are not the best suited to decide investment matters.  
Therefore, the plus factor “actions against self-interest” has no place in 
13(d) group formation. 
The plus factor “motive to conspire” is also irrelevant in section 13(d) 
cases.  In antitrust law, courts express skepticism toward “motive to 
conspire” because these claims may be nothing more than evidence of 
interdependence.424  For this reason, courts hold that there is no inference of 
a conspiracy when an oligopolist raises prices in the hope that his 
competitors also will do so.425  Similar to an oligopoly, hedge fund activism 
requires some level of interdependence because no hedge fund takes a 
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controlling stake in the target.  The presence alone of other activist hedge 
funds can be enough to give the lead wolf leverage.  Therefore, arguing that 
activist hedge funds have a motive to form a group simply points out that 
activist campaigns require interdependence.  Additionally, in antitrust law, 
a motive to profit is not evidence of a conspiracy.426  Activist hedge funds 
may seek to implement changes in their targets, but their underlying 
motive—and the reason for their existence—is to increase their profits.  
Therefore, “motive to conspire” cannot be a 13(d) group plus factor. 
The plus factor “market concentration and structure” also does not 
translate to section 13(d) cases.  In antitrust law, evidence of market 
concentration and structure is relevant where alleged conspirators make up 
a majority of the market and have relatively fixed shares.427  In that 
situation, the market is more susceptible to price fixing, especially on the 
selling side.428  Whether a product is infungible is also important to this 
consideration.429  A wolf pack does not take a controlling share in its 
targets, so it does not make up a majority of the market for those 
corporations’ stock.  Further, hedge funds are on the buy side of the market, 
and their ability to purchase more shares means that the market for shares of 
the target’s stock is not fixed.  Similarly, as any investor can buy a target’s 
outstanding stock, shareholders may be considered fungible themselves.  
Therefore, “market concentration and structure” is irrelevant in 13(d) group 
formation. 
“Pretextual explanations” also has no place in 13(d) group cases.  Most 
activist hedge fund campaigns are not public knowledge.430  Smaller 
activist hedge funds can remain silent and allow the lead wolf to 
communicate with the target’s management.431  Oftentimes, lead wolves 
have a preconceived notion of the change they would like to implement in 
the target, however, they are free to pursue a different change if they see 
value.  Therefore, what may seem to be evidence of pretextual explanations 
is actually a change in direction.  This remains true if an activist hedge fund 
announces its investment to the public.  It is only when a shareholder 
crosses the 5 percent threshold and must file a Schedule 13D that it is 
required to state a purpose.432  At that point, an investor is required to 
amend its Schedule 13D whenever their purpose changes.433  If it does not 
amend its Schedule 13D, yet changes the purpose for its investment, section 
13(d) is violated and the target—or its shareholders—may bring suit.  In 
that situation, pretextual explanations will be evidence of a section 13(d) 
violation, but they will not be evidence of group formation.  Therefore, 
“pretextual explanations” should not be a 13(d) plus factor. 
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The plus factor “involvement in other conspiracies” has no place in 13(d) 
group formation.  Even in antitrust law, courts are reluctant to consider 
involvement in other conspiracies as evidence of price fixing.434  The 
Supreme Court has gone so far as to reject evidence of a different 
conspiracy as holding weight in later antitrust cases.435  Like antitrust law, 
13(d) group formation cases require another conspiracy-like determination. 
Given courts’ skepticism of this plus factor, it makes little sense to apply it 
to wolf pack formation cases. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent growth in hedge fund activism, specifically the wolf pack, 
necessitates a clear formula for determining when a 13(d) group is formed.  
The antitrust doctrine, conscious parallelism—used to discover conspiracies 
that are analogous to section 13(d)’s agreement requirement—should be 
applied in wolf pack group formation cases.  Under the proposed section 
13(d) framework, to show group activity, a plaintiff would need to show the 
first element—conscious parallelism—and plus factors to prove that 
defendants agreed to act for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting, or 
disposing of securities. 
Opportunity to conspire, sharing of price information, signaling, and 
customary indications of traditional conspiracy are plus factors that should 
be adopted from antitrust law.  Additionally, communication regarding 
displeasure with management, discussions to avoid triggering a poison pill, 
and actions taken to affect the corporate direction of a target are all 
circumstantial evidence that should be adopted as plus factors in 13(d) 
group cases.  Finally, the antitrust plus factors actions against self-interest, 
motive to conspire, market concentration and structure, pretextual 
explanations, and involvement in other conspiracies serve no use in wolf 
pack 13(d) cases and thus should be discarded.  Adopting the antitrust 
framework would provide clearer factors to guide courts in dealing with 
wolf pack group formation. 
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